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What Is Behind the "Property Rights"
Debate?
John A. Humbach*
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council' obviously
presents issues that range far more broadly than just whether

people should be allowed to build on beaches and dunes.
Many observers have viewed the case as a splendid opportunity for the Supreme Court to re-establish private owner autonomy in land use decisions - to cut down, perhaps drastically, on elected legislatures' traditional power to protect the
environment by regulating uses of land.2 Behind the "property rights" debate is the question of whether states and communities really ought to have the power that they have traditionally had to control the development and patterns of
growth within their bounds.
* J.D. Ohio State University. He is currently a Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), rev'g and remanding 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). The
Supreme Court's decision in Lucas was rendered after the remarks I made at the
Center for Environmental Legal Studies Colloquium, on which this article is based.
That decision did not, however, change the concerns that lie behind the larger property rights debate that are the central concern of this article.
2. "This term could be a dream come true for property owners fuming over regulations restricting the use of their land and for conservative legal strategists longing
for an economic rights revival." Marcia Coyle, Property Revival, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27,
1992, at 1; Tony Mauro, Court Poised to Rewrite Property Rights Doctrine,THE RECORDER, Feb. 25, 1992, at 7; Kirstin Downey, A Conservative Supreme Court Addresses Property Rights, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at Hi.
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The contentions in Lucas are part of a much larger debate, a debate that will surely continue regardless of the ultimate decision in the case. The debate stems from a major difference of views about "property rights," a fundamental
disagreement as to the proper role and, especially, the priority
to be accorded to private property rights in decisions of public
policy. There have been a number of manifestations of this
sharp division of views.
We see the strength of the emerging "property rights"
movement in the successful lobbying campaign that has
stymied the efforts of three federal agencies to rationalize federal wetlands regulations and standardize wetlands definitions.' We see it in proposed legislation such as the Private
Property Protection Act of 1991, essentially a move to curb
federal regulatory power, passed by the Senate as part of the
bill to raise the Environmental Protection Agency to Cabinet
status.' We see it in new cases in the courts, by one recent
count nearly 200 of them in the Federal Claims Court alone.5
Current claims for relief against the federal government have
been estimated to exceed over a billion dollars as people try to
reach out and tap the Treasury because of wetlands and other
environmental regulations that they do not like.6
Most importantly, however, we see the divergence of
views as to the priority of property in ordinary civic discourse
on issues of land use, communities' futures and protecting environmental resources. Concerned citizens enter into these
discussions and find themselves met right up front with the
"property rights" objection - the argument that we do not
even need to talk about this or that innovative way of safeguarding our shared surroundings, the character of our com3. See, e.g., Zinn & Copeland, Wetland Issues in the 102d Cong., Cong. Res.
Serv. Iss. Br. 91058 (9/12/91).
4. Originally offered as S. 50, the bill would codify and harden the impact of a
1988 Executive Order (E.O. 12630), which authorizes the Department of Justice to
review and rule on the effect that proposed federal regulations will have on private
property rights.
5. Keith Schneider, Environmental Laws Face a Stiff Test From Landowners,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al.
6. William G. Laffer III, The PrivateProperty Rights Act: Forcing Federal Regulators to Obey the Bill of Rights, HERITAGE FOUND. REP. Iss. BULL. 173 (1992), at 8-9.
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munity, or our nation's remaining unspoiled natural beauty:
Any attempt to restrict people from ruining these key components of the world around us would be an unconstitutional
"taking" of private property rights. If a land-use regulation is
objectionable to private owners, it should not be imposed at least not without compensation. The property rights objection is intended as a discussion stopper, and it works as a discussion stopper, immobilizing the effort and stifling the
debate.
On one side of the great divide are the defenders of private property rights. Mostly, they are people energized by a
strong and understandable desire to protect their own economic interests. Typically, they are owners of non-urban land
- farmers, forest owners, holders of mining interests and
speculators. The basic claim of the property-rights advocates
has, however, a much wider appeal. It is a claim founded on
deeply rooted ideas ringing of basic fairness: "What's mine is
mine." Phrased in these terms, such claims have a powerful
pull on the American psyche, and even people with nothing at
all to gain by enlarging the autonomy of large landowners can
identify with these claims and respond to them. And when the
claims come wrapped in the philosophical garb of privatemarket economic theory and free enterprise ideology, bonded
with a healthy dose of suspicion about government generally,
they can be very potent indeed.
Although the economic interests advanced on the property movement side are fairly obvious, the people aligned on
the other side of the debate mostly have no such personal
stake, at least no economic stake, in the outcome. The proponents of growth management and environmental defense are,
rather, people who believe that, to have a high quality of life,
Americans need to have pleasant and satisfactory surroundings in which to live. They are people who are convinced that
laws such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species
Act address important and serious concerns. They are people
who think that all Americans have a stake in the future of our
one-and-only national landbase, and that, as a matter of basic
patriotism, we ought to be treating this country as though we
still want there to be a country here 50 years from now, or 100
3
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years from now, as a decent, vital, economically viable and
beautiful place for human beings, future Americans, to live.
Until Lucas came to the Supreme Court, the opposition
of views in the "property rights" debate had been mostly
skirmishes. Even so, for people merrily toiling away at environmental protection and land-use regulation, the force and
conviction of the property rights counterthrust has been like a
sleeping giant come awake. Industrial, agricultural and other
natural resource interests that once viewed environmental and
land-use regulation with grudging toleration, started to realize
that the proponents of protecting our national landbase can
be dangerous people - people who can influence balance
sheets and affect personal wealth. To fend off the side-effects
that land-use regulations can have on private wealth, these
special economic interests have raised the question: "Does
government have the authority to take regulatory action that
'7
diminishes the value of property?"
Clearly, of course, government traditionally has had the
authority to take actions that affect property values, such as
regulating socially detrimental uses of land. Just as clearly,
however, many people think government should not have that
authority - not, at least, unless it compensates those whose
"rights" to make the detrimental uses are impaired. The issue
is typically raised, as it was raised by the owner in Lucas, in
terms of "taking," with the contention that government restrictions on property use "take" away property rights.
Couched in these terms, the matter seems naturally to be one
calling for judicial review under the so-called Takings Clause
of the United States Constitution."
Defining the legal issue in terms of "takings" of property
rights, however, tilts the inquiry and distracts attention from
the central purpose of land-use regulations, which is something else altogether. It is just as accurate to frame the issues
7. Property Rights Debate Raging Across the Nation, 22 N.E. Agric., Mid-Atl.
Ed., no. 3, p.1 (1991). See also William G. Laffer III, The Property Rights Act: Forcing Federal Regulators to Obey the Bill of Rights, HERITAGE FOUND. REP. Iss. BULL.
173 (1992).
8. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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of land-use regulation as questions of whether, and to what
extent, private persons should be allowed to carry on activities
(including land use) that are detrimental to the well-being of
other people or of the community as a whole. After all, the
only thing that restrictions on land use "take away," when
you get down to it, are the "rights" that private owners previously had to use their land in ways that spill over negatively
onto others, interfering with others' needs, "rights" if you will,
to healthy, uplifting and livable surroundings. Compared with
the "taking of property" emphasis, this way of looking at the
issue at least gets the perspective more in accord with the actual priorities by putting the focus on the regulations' purpose instead of on their incidental side-effects (which are essentially inevitable concomitants of having any government at
all).9
Proper emphasis or not, however, when a disgruntled
landowner wants to challenge a legislative determination to
regulate the use of his land, the Takings Clause has become
the basis for obtaining judicial review of the legislative choice.
The claim of "taking" has become, in short, the primary line
of attack for those who want to nullify the decision of an
elected legislature to add to the list of unacceptably harmful
land uses. It is not, however, so obvious that the Takings
Clause is a very good vehicle for this purpose. Originally, the
takings clause was not intended for any such purpose at all.
The history of the matter appears to be rather clear: The
purpose of the takings clause was to assure compensation for
cases of physical taking. 10 The father of the clause, James
Madison, feared that once the masses received ultimate political power under the new Constitution they might turn around
and use that power to redistribute property away from the
wealthy, from people like Madison himself.11 As constitutional
9. "Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
10. See, e.g., William M. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985).
11. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 268 (1990).

5

26

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

provisions go, the Takings Clause is somewhat unique in that
it creates just about the only surviving constitutional right included for the deliberate purpose of promoting (or, at least,
preserving) inequality. Even at that, however, for the first
hundred years or so of our Republic, no one seriously considered the Takings Clause to have any direct bearing on behavioral regulations adopted by legislatures to preserve the public
interest.1 2
As Mr. Harness quoted in his article from Mugler v. Kansas,1" the prevailing 19th century view was, essentially, that
"all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the
community."1" It was recognized, in other words, that property ownership is not just rights, but that property also entails
obligation. There is a social obligation of property that requires owners to refrain from uses of property that could have
negative side-effects on other people or on the community as a
whole.' 5 The catalogue of impermissible side-effects was not,
of course, regarded as fixed. On the contrary, it was recog12. "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property
for the public benefit." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
See also Scott M. Reznick, Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of
Takings in Nineteenth Century America, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 854 (1973). As late as
1897, the Supreme Court still regarded a "physical invasion of the real estate" as a
prerequisite of a compensable "taking." Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76
(1897), (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878). "[Ajcts done
in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon
private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held
not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision.") Id. (emphasis
added). Writing for the Court in Lucas, Justice Scalia agreed that "early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property
at all," but Justice Scalia regarded such details of original understanding as "entirely
irrelevant." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.15.
13. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a state statute prohibiting production or sale
of alcoholic beverages despite the disastrous effect that it had on the use and value of
a privately-owned beer brewing facility).
14. Id. at 665. As the Court explained in Mugler, a state is not required to "compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of
their not being permitted .. .to inflict injury upon the community." Id. at 669.
15. I have written about this at some length in a previous article, Law and a
New Land Ethic, 74 MINN L. REv. 339, 344-48 (1989).
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nized that, as times and circumstance changed, legislatures
existed for the purpose of adding new kinds of harmful activities to the list of those whose negative spillover impacts, once
tolerable, had lately become socially unacceptable."
Around the turn of the century, however, a change of outlook began to emerge, a greater judicial solicitude for private
economic autonomy that became epitomized, for purposes of
the Takings Clause, by the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.17 It was in Mahon that the Supreme Court laid the basis for the modern regulatory takings
concept with the statement: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."'"
In this now famous quotation, the Supreme Court
brought together and established the fundamental relationship between the two polar principles of modern regulatory
takings law. First, as recognized in the Mugler line of cases,
there is the older principle that government can regulate the
uses of land and other kinds of property, and diminish their
value by such regulation, without paying compensation. Secondly, as an offsetting anchor point, the Court established its
new "too far" principle, essentially a warrant to the judiciary
to strike down regulations that judges consider excessive in
their impact on private owners. Poised between these two
points of reference, the jurisprudence of takings was then left
by the Supreme Court to the state courts, more or less exclu16. "Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere;
.. [u~nder our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887). And "in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of
such interests." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
In response to challenges to legislative action adding to the public nuisance list,
the Supreme Court said that "it was clearly within the police powers of the State...
'to declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a [use affecting
the "health and comfort of the community"] shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and
in law.'" Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (quoting Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915)).
17. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (striking down state legislation that prohibited the removal of coal from under people's homes).
18. Id. at 415.
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sively, for the next 40 or 50 years."9
During the period between Mahon in 1922 and its late
1970's resumption of accepting regulatory takings cases, the
Supreme Court's turn-of-the-century ideology towards economic legislation was completely reversed. The Court disclaimed any proper judicial role to review, as "super-legislature," 0 the wisdom of legislative determinations in matters of
economic regulation, and generally deferred to the determinations of elected legislatures to set public policy in the economic sphere. In 1980, however, the Court added another important twist to takings clause jurisprudence by seemingly
approving the use of the clause as a partial surrogate for the
previously repudiated "economic due process" review. Enlarging on some dicta in the 1978 case Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City,2 ' the Court wrote in the 1980 case of Agins
v. Tiburon2 2 that a land-use regulation will effect a "taking" if
it "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. ' 23 Accordingly, in addition to looking at whether a regu19. With the perhaps notable exception of Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding a prohibition on gravel mining), the Supreme Court decided essentially no land-use regulatory takings cases between the late 1920's and
Penn Central TransporationCo. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20. Day-Bright Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("we do not sit as a
super-legislature"). See also, e.g., Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
21. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding city historic preservation law against challenge that it effected a "taking" of the rights to develop airspace above Grand Central
Terminal). The dicta referred to stated that: "a use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose .... or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use
of the property." Id. at 127.
The thrust of this dicta is practically identical with the content, albeit not the
wording, of the classic formulation of economic due process in Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133, 137 (1894): "To justify the State in ...interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public . . .require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." This language in Lawton was quoted by the Court in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962), which, in turn, was cited by the Court in support for its
above-quoted language from Penn Central.
22. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding zoning for minimum lot sizes up to five
acres).
23. In fuller quotation, the Court stated that a land-use regulation applied "to
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lation results in a physical taking (the original mission of takings review) and at whether it goes "too far" by denying the
owner "economically viable use" (from Mahon), the Agins
Court added a third test. It specifically called for judges to
decide, in cases of takings challenge, whether the land-use
regulations under attack could indeed be considered to substantially advance any legitimate interest of government.
In summary, by the early 1980s, the Supreme Court had
three distinct per se sounding tests for takings:
(1) permanent physical invasion,"'
(2) insufficient relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose, and
(3) its modern formulation of the Mahon "too far" test,
namely: A regulation is a taking if it "denies an owner
economically viable use of his land."
I describe these as only per se "sounding" tests because, apart
from physical invasion, the Supreme Court has never actually
said that it means to apply its takings tests in a strictly per se
manner.2 5 On the contrary, the ostensibly "per se" character
of Agins' economically viable use test is considerably belied
by the Court's insistence, in Agins and thereafter, on a need
for balancing, stating that takings determinations "necessarily
26
require[] a weighing of private and public interests."
particular property effects a taking if [it] does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at 260
(citations omitted).
24. The permanent physical invasion test for takings was strikingly reaffirmed as
applying irrespective of economic or other impact in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (striking down a New York law requiring apartment building owners to allow cable television lines to be strung across their properties with only nominal compensation).
25. In Lucas, of course, the Court declared that a denial of economically viable
use amounting to a "total taking" had indeed become a "categorical" test of taking seemingly on a par with physical invasion. One way of reading this is that total takings of all value now require, just as physical invasion, that compensation be paid
without any weighing of such offsetting factors as the strong public interest in or
purpose behind the regulation in question. 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94. But cf. discussion in
following footnote 26, infra.
26. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261, quoted in Keystone Bituminous v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 492 (1987). Although the Court in Lucas purported to accord "categorical

9
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The comparatively rapid expansion of Supreme Court
takings doctrine in the past decade or so has given rise to at
least two key questions now in public debate:
First, there is the fundamental question whether government should always have to pay compensation whenever regulatory actions adversely affect private property values, or
whether there are kinds of harms which should be prohib27
itable without payment?
Second, there is the question of whether, assuming government should have some power to regulate property use
without paying, compensation should at least be required
when regulatory action removes all value from particular
property. In other words, can there ever be a public interest
strong enough to justify a total wipe out of value? This was, in
essence, the legal question on which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari review in the Lucas case. 8
treatment" to the economic use test, see previous footnote, it did specify that even
total takings of all value could be justified by the state if the legislation in question
did no more than "duplicate" the prohibitions applicable under the common law of
nuisance. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2901. The "weighing" that may occur in making
such determinations of nuisance may, however, turn out to be little different from the
"weighing" that would occur as prescribed in Agins. It is not clear, in other words,
whether Lucas has effected much change other than a change in nomenclature and
rubric while substance stays the same.
27. See, e.g., William G. Laffer III, The Private Property Rights Act: Forcing
Federal Regulators to Obey the Bill of Rights, HERITAGE FOUND. RP. Iss. BuLL. 173
(1992) at 6, making the flat statement:
"If a regulation leaves a property owner with some remaining 'economically
viable use,' . . . the owner is entitled, ....

to compensation for the drop in

value resulting from the regulation."
Mr. Laffer does not cite cases for this striking proposition and, of course, he could not
cite any U.S. Supreme Court cases. On the contrary, the Supreme Court's cases "uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can
establish a 'taking.'" Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131
(1978). Indeed, as has been for many decades explicit, regulations can remove very
large proportions of value and still not be compensable takings. See Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75%); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(87.5%), and both modernly cited with approval, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125-26
and 131.
But the matter must be regarded as one of debate. See also supra text accompanying note 7.
28. Petitioner's Brief on Merits, at i, Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2886.
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1. Should government be expected to pay compensation
whenever use-restrictions diminish the value of private property, or should legislatures be allowed to ban
at least some kinds of harm without compensating
the property owners adversely affected?
Undoubtedly the most extreme contention to emerge
from the property rights movement is the notion that government use-regulations that diminish property values should always be accompanied by compensation. Despite the grand
statements that may be found along these lines, however,
none of the more thoughtful property rights advocates really
seems to suppose that government always should have to pay
when its regulations reduce value. As one writer put it recently, "if a regulation merely prevents someone from engaging in activities that would violate the rights of others under
the common law of nuisance or trespass," there is no right to
compensation.2 9 Professor Richard Epstein at the University
of Chicago, widely regarded as the leading intellectual light of
the property rights movement, likewise acknowledges that
"the issue of compensation cannot arise until the question of
justification has been disposed of. In the typical nuisance prevention case, this question is resolved against the claimant."3 0
However, and here is the key point of distinction, the property rights advocates tend to define the "rights of others"
fairly narrowly.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has sought to explain the constitutionality of restrictions on property use by positing the existence of a "nuisance exception" to the general requirement of
just compensation.3 1 Following this line of thought, the question boils down to what counts as a "nuisance" for purposes of
the "nuisance" exception?" In other words, which harmful
29. William G. Laffer III, The Private Property Rights Act: Forcing Federal
HERITAGE FOUND. RmP. Iss. BULL. 173 (1992)
(emphasis added).
30. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 199 (1985).
31. See, e.g., the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion in Keystone Bituminous v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
32. In phrasing the question in this way, I accept the "nuisance" nomenclature

Regulators to Obey the Bill of Rights,
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uses of land should legislatures be allowed to prohibit without
compensation and which harmful land uses should legislatures
have to pay in order to prohibit?
The basic idea of a nuisance oriented exception to the
just compensation requirement is, of course, pretty simple:
Since nobody "has a right to use his property so as to create a
nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken'
anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like
activity.""3 Certainly, insofar as the exception applies to conduct that clearly would be adjudicated to be a common-law
nuisance anyway (should the case so arise), the nuisance exception is not merely logical, it is a tautology: No question of
"taking" can arise when a legislature prohibits that which is
already prohibited." But what about nuisance-like activity?
What about the italicized portion of the quotation above - to
the effect that no one has a right to use property in ways that
"otherwise" harm others?
The question of whether the proper scope of the nuisance
exception is narrow, limited essentially in scope to commonlaw nuisances, or is broader, and (if so) by how much, represented a key point of difference between the five-justice majority and the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion in Lucas'
main precedent, the 1987 case of Keystone Bituminous v.
DeBenedictis.3 5 The distinct difference in philosophical approach to property rights was not buried by Keystone's 5-4
for rhetorical convenience, but not for purposes of conceptual limitation. That is to
say, by using the term "nuisance" I do not mean to imply that the class of constitutionally prohibitable uses should necessarily be restricted to some exogenously defined common-law category.
33. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20 (emphasis added).
34. The Supreme Court explicitly embraced this position in Lucas. Even when
the effect of a regulation is to deprive a private owner of all economic value and use,

it will be valid if what it prohibits was already prohibited in the courts under "background principles" of state nuisance or property law. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. Depending on how state courts interpret their powers under the state's own common law
of nuisance, this nuisance analysis presents a potentially gaping exception to the ostensibly "categorical treatment" that it declared for such "total takings." Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2899-2901. The nuisance principle should, therefore, continue to apply a
fortiori with equal force to regulations that deprive the owner of less than all value
and use.
35. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/3
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vote, and the Lucas case was seen as an opportunity for the
narrow approach of the Keystone dissent to become the majority view.
[As it has turned out, the Supreme Court in Lucas rejected the idea that a narrowly scoped "nuisance exception" (as advanced by the Keystone dissent) is the general explanation for why land-use regulations can
diminish values without compensation. Instead, it recognized that there is a "broad realm within which government may regulate without compensation, ''8 3 and stated

that earlier "harmful or noxious use" analysis37 was "simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements
that 'land use regulation does not effect a taking if it
"substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests".
' "88

At the same time, however, the Lucas Court adapted and
applied the Keystone dissent's narrowly scoped "nuisance
exception" to a new task, namely, that of defining the extent of legislatures' power to cause "total takings" (regulations that deprive some land parcels of "all economically beneficial use").39 The original remarks that
followed at this point have been truncated to reflect the
new but more confined role for the "nuisance exception."]
There is a fundamental conceptual difficulty in constructing any sort of common-law based "nuisance exception" to define the general grant of legislative power. The difficulty is
that legislatures basically exist in order to improve, remediate
and expand on the common law as deficiencies are discovered.40 To the extent, therefore, that the legislative power is
36. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
37. That is, the theory that justifies valid police-power regulations on the ground
that they merely implement the governmental power to ban uses that are akin to
public nuisances. Id. at 2890, 2897.
38. Id. at 2897. The Court described the government's power to "affect property
values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate" as "a reality we
nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State's police
power." Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 2899-2901.
40. As the Supreme Court once observed, it is "the great office of statutes... to
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itself confined by developments in the common law of nuisance, an essential legislative function, "to remedy defects in
the common law,"' is incapacitated. The effect is to reverse
the relative roles of elected legislatures and courts.
Courts, bound to an extent by stare decisis, are not always in the best position to meet the needs for change and
improvement in the common law. "2 The common law of nuisance is no exception, and there is ample support in the Supreme Court's cases for allowing legislatures to restrict virtually any use of property, common-law nuisance or not, once
the use has been legislatively deemed to have harmful external impacts. 8 We can speculate how even the justices who
favor narrowing the exceptions to the just-compensation mandate would respond to a local law banning, for example, marijuana crops on private land. This can be a "valuable" use of
land and was certainly no nuisance at common law. But not
even the dissenters in Keystone (it is my guess) would insist
that state bans on marijuana production must compensate
4
growers for the loss of business opportunity. '
Beyond this, however, the common law of nuisance is just
not logically or doctrinally suited at all to serve as the delimremedy defects in the common law," adapting to the "changes of times and circumstances." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312, 314, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (1970) (maintaining that courts are not equipped "as
a by-product of private litigation" to institute major changes in air pollution (nuisance) policy, a task far better left to the legislature).
43. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (trading in eagle feathers);
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (lots smaller than 1-5 acres); Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (six students in a house); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962) (mining gravel); Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919)
(timber scraps left on ground); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (tall buildings);
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (selling water interstate);
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (margarine); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887) (alcoholic beverages).
44. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote at one point in his Keystone dissent
that the State has: "unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using
his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden
use." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511. In the recent case of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Chief Justice described a ban on using certain land for showing adult films as "the essence of zoning." Id. at 54.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/3

14

1992]

LUCAS COLLOQUIUM

iter of the harms that legislatures can prohibit without compensation. Anyone who thinks that the constitutional law of
"takings" is an unruly chaos should take a look at the law of
nuisance. Indeed, the historic range of "public" nuisance law,
the common-law precursor of most modern legislative landuse regulations, was essentially co-extensive with the police
power generally. In fact, cases define public nuisance as any
act or omission that "injuriously affects the safety, health or
morals of the public,"' 5 practically the same words typically
used to describe the police power. 6
Compared with the modern statutory body of public nuisance law, the law of private nuisance impinges but little on
private owner autonomy - a factor that no doubt commends
it as a delimiter of government regulation to those who would
like to see less of such regulation. The lesser impingement of
private nuisance law is, however, mainly due to its essential
nature as a private property protection: Being a matter of private right, the conduct standards of private nuisance can be
imposed only in cases where there are specific aggrieved parties with specific measurable injuries to their property. Nevertheless, some writers, perhaps attracted by this important
"standing" limitation, seem to have the law of private nuisance primarily in mind when they speak of common-law nuisance as a logical delimiter of legislatures' power to affect
property rights.4 7 But the law of private nuisance is, if any45. Commonwealth v. South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry., 205 S.W. 581, 583
(Ky. Ct. App. 1918). See also Copart Indus. v. Consol. Edison, 41 N.Y.2d 564, 568,
362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (1977) (acts that "endanger or injure the property, health, safety
or comfort of a considerable number of persons"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS,
§ 821B(2)(a) (1977) (public health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience).
46. E.g., "Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order
- these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of
the police power .... ." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
47. See, e.g., Professor Epstein's account of the nuisance basis for uncompensated use restrictions, in which the stress is laid on private actions that invade others'
property rights as the "wrongs" that justify the government's non-compensated inter-

vention.

RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 108-25 (1985). "The intellectual source of the police power," he writes, "lies
in the marriage of precise private law analogues to a general theory of representative
The police power as a ground for legitimate public intervention is,
government ....
then, exactly the same as when a private party acts on his own behalf. The individual
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thing, even more useless than the law of public nUisance to
cabin legislative powers to affect property rights without compensation. The point is that the law of nuisance simply does
not define a class of reprehensible or tortious behavior whose
nature justifies something (governmental "taking") that would
otherwise be wrongful.
In sum, while nearly everybody may agree that there are
some situations in which government should be able to regulate without paying compensation, there is real underlying
disagreement as to how such situations should be defined.
While government obviously should not have to pay criminals
and other wrongdoers not to commit their wrongs, who defines
"wrong?" Traditionally, both courts and legislatures have
been able to redefine "wrong" by adding new items to the list
of prohibited conduct, and the Supreme Court has been very
clear that the police power of state legislatures includes the
power to declare new kinds of nuisances, beyond those known
at common law.48 Whether legislatures, as elected representatives of the people, should continue to have such authority is
one of the issues underlying the property rights debate.
2.

Can public policy considerations ever be sufficiently
compelling to justify use-restrictions that deprive
owners of all use entirely?

This second question in the continuing property-rights
debate implies a more modest version of the basic contention
that governments should not diminish property values with... loses that protection [from takings] when he himself takes or threatens to take
property." Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
The problem is that Professor Epstein does not appear to acknowledge adequately the possibility that human beings may enter into society and form governments for the purpose of securing, in addition to property, a decent and pleasant
surrounding world in which to live - very much a concern of the law of public nuisance and the police power, though only an incidental concern of private nuisance
law.
48. It has been held to be "clearly within the police power of the State . . . 'to
declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a [use affecting
the "health and comfort of the community"] shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and
in law.'" Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915), (quoting Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (emphasis added)).
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out compensation. In this more modest version, the argument
goes: Compensation should be paid, at least when government
regulations reduce a property's value all the way to zero. Put a
different way, the public interest can never be so weighty as to
justify wiping out an individual owner totally without paying.
Indeed, it can be said that if a public interest in prohibiting a
particular use is so overwhelmingly compelling, there certainly
will be a willingness on the part of the public to pay, and unwillingness to pay simply proves that the supposed public
49
benefit is not worth the opportunity cost.
Of all their claims, the contention that wipe-outs (at least
total wipe-outs) are never constitutionally justified has the
greatest real potential for being a winner for the property
rights movement - and, hence, the greatest potential to endanger our nation's natural land and resource base. It is a potential winner for the property rights side because, for one
thing, a deprivation of all value raises most pointedly the feeling that inequity is involved. There is, even more importantly,
significant supporting obiter dictum in the two-part takings
test of Agins v. Tiburon5 0 - namely, that a land use regulation will effect a taking if it (under the second of the two
prongs) "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."
The potential success of the contention presents a danger
to our natural landbase because many important landforms wetlands, beaches and dunes, watersheds for drinking water
supplies, endangered species habitats, and other ecologically
sensitive areas - have essentially no economically viable use
49. In a variety of circumstances, of course, government operates to secure public
advantages without paying the opportunity cost borne by those to whom burdens are
consequently shifted. A few examples that come quickly to mind are the military
draft, control of the interest rates by central banking authorities, prohibition of certain lines of business (such as trading with the enemy, or manufacture of narcotic
drugs), and the recognition of unequally distributed private property rights (by ratifying the pre-existing unequal patterns of possession) in the first place.
Correspondingly, governments normally also do not assess for the benefits that
they provide (such as security from foreign invaders, relatively stable money markets,
and the multitudinous public services and infrastructure that account for most of the
current market value of most parcels of privately owned land).
50. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for discussion of the two-part takings test.
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in terms of current commercial values. As a consequence,
land-use regulations that go far enough to be effective in retaining the important natural character of these lands may
leave the lands' owner with no value.
Apart from the dicta in Agins, however, the Supreme
Court's cases have recognized many instances in which a public purpose to prevent harmful uses of property has justified
legislative measures that take all market value from private
owners. Actually, the law is so clear on this subject that it is
rather amazing (Agins dicta aside) that the constitutionality
of such measures is still a matter of debate. Historically, there
has simply been no doubt that public welfare concerns can
suffice to justify total destruction of the value of private
property.
One classic example is measures to protect public health,
such as when government agents confiscate spoiled food, rotten meat, adulterated baby formula and the like. 1 Public
emergency situations present another kind of classic case, for
example, blowing up a house to prevent the spread of a fire,
destroying petroleum facilities to keep them out of enemy
hands, or wrecking a bridge to keep it from falling to hostile
forces. 2
There is, to be sure, a wide distance between the public
concerns represented in land-use legislation and those implicated when it comes to winning a war. But the warfare cases
provide, nevertheless, an instructive beginning point for understanding the question of whether the public interest can
"ever" justify a total taking of all value. The answer they provide is clearly "yes."
A far more important class of constitutionally permissible
in toto takings is the now popular statutory forfeiture of lands
51. E.g., North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (confiscation of spoiled food); see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 673 (1988 & Supp. II 1991) (authorizing
seizure of adulterated meat, etc.).
52. Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879) (blowing up a house to stop
spread of fire). See also United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952) (destroying
terminal facilities in path of hostile forces), quoting United States v. Pacific R.R., 120
U.S. 227, 234 (1887) ("The safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss").
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or chattels in order to prevent their use in ways that are
deemed "undesirable. ' 53 Who determines what is "undesirable" for purposes of statutory forfeiture? Such determinations are, of course, left to legislatures, which are given very
ample latitude in deciding that "legitimate governmental interests" or "legitimate purposes" 5 4 justify total expropriations
of innocent owners' property. To prevent the use of narcotic
drugs, for example, the legislature can authorize not only confiscation of the drug, but also confiscation of a yacht in which
the drugs were transported - even if the yacht owner had
nothing to do with the transportation, had no knowledge of it,
55
and had basically no realistic ability to stop it.
Despite the "difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of
traditional forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment,"' 56 the Supreme Court always manages to
reconcile the two. In short, statutory forfeiture is a clear modern example of how the public interest alone can justify in
toto takings of innocent owners' property quite apart from the
guilt or the innocence of the owner.
This brings us, then, to the crux of the issue. What if,
instead of confiscating property in its entirety to prevent "undesirable" use, the legislature decides on less drastic measures
- taking merely the owner's right to make the "undesirable"
use. Even though less drastic, the result can still sometimes be
to deprive the owner of all value. If the only market value that
a piece of land has is attributable to uses that are deemed too
socially harmful to allow, the use restriction will take all
value.
Are governmental actions that merely forbid a detrimental use somehow more constitutionally suspect than ones that
address "undesirable" uses by taking away the property entirely? I would not think so, and there is indeed precedent.
53. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926) (transporting liquor). See also
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
54. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 688, 690. See also
United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983) ("important governmental
purposes").
55. United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983).
56. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971).
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Consider, for example, the case of an unsanitary tenement
house, one that has no plumbing and is located in a residential district of a large and densely populated city. Suppose
that the cost of installing plumbing would exceed the value of
the house. If the city council decides that pit toilets in tenement backyards have become socially intolerable, and it bans
them, the result will be a total loss to the tenement owner.
These are the facts of Tenement House Department v. Moeschen,7 in which the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
ban on outdoor toilets and the Supreme Court affirmed, despite the total loss borne by the tenement owner. The government does not have to buy an unsanitary tenement house in
order to prevent its use in socially deleterious ways.
What, then, is the meaning and the future of the "economically viable use" test from Agins? Although frequently
repeated, the economically viable use test was obiter in Agins
and has been obiter since." The law of statutory forfeiture
seems completely incompatible with any such flat constitutional guarantee of economically viable use.5 9 The Lucas case
is focused directly, however, on whether current market conditions should play a key role in the legislative power to regulate land uses.6 0

57. 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E. 231 (1904), aff'g without opinion 203 U.S. 583 (1906)
(tenement owner ordered to replace outdoor privy with expensive indoor toilets).
58. The speech, on which this article is based, was given before the decision in
Lucas and, on this point, has been contradicted by the Lucas holding. See supra note
1 and accompanying text. As noted earlier,. Lucas held that a land-use regulation
effecting a "total taking" of "all economically beneficial use" ipso facto requires compensation unless it forbids nothing more than was already forbidden under the state's
background principles of property and nuisance law.
59. In Lucas, the Court may have succeeded in achieving at least a partial reconciliation between its "categorical treatment" of total takings and legislative power to
adopt statutory forfeitures. It did so by indicating that the rule for "total takings"
was applicable only to real estate interests and not to personal property. While statutory forfeiture may more typically be applied to chattels, it can also be applied
against innocent owners' real estate. Unless the Court is prepared to limit such real
estate forfeitures to cases of "common law nuisances," there is some new law - or
specious distinction - that remains to be made.
60. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at i; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886.
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Conclusion

Nobody can, of course, predict the impact of Lucas. Prior
to the decision, it was the guess of many (including myself)
that the Court would not pioneer a new expansion of the
"fundamental rights" concept into the property area. There
was substantial ground to think that the more conservative
members of the Supreme Court would recall their aversion to
judicial activists who substitute their own predilections for
the decisions of elected legislatures, and that they would remember their commitment to federalism and their mistrust of
federal intrusions that limit the states' abilities to find the
right solutions to meet their own local needs. There was reason to think, as well, that the Court would also remember the
original intention of the takings clause, and resist expanding
upon the plain judicial activism of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the activism that created the whole
"regulatory taking" concept in the first place.
However the courts approach these issues post-Lucas, I
hope that they keep in mind that the issue here is not a rarifled 18th century philosophical debate about Lockean private
property rights or the "natural" relationship between human
beings and their government. Rather, what is ultimately at
stake is our nation's ability to protect the natural resources on
which its vitality and economic strength depend. As important as the historic sanctity of private property may be, Americans can simply no longer afford the luxury of leaving our
vital natural resources, our national landbase, vulnerable to
the poorly planned development or badly executed utilization
that can occur when all land-use decisions are dominated by
short-term market pressures. We cannot afford the luxury of
leaving the future of our country to the self-oriented decisions
of a relative few who happen to be temporary owners in our
generation.
This debate is simply not destined to peter out very soon.
Neither side of the property rights debate will let it. The
land-use autonomy of private owners will continue to be an
important policy end for those whose own economic interests
benefit from it. And, against their contentions, other Ameri-
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cans will continue to urge that our nation cannot give up its
right to protect its own natural resources, that no nation can
ever rightly bind itself to pay off those who say: "Pay me or I
might destroy my bit of the national land." Private property
rights are important, but they are not the only thing that is
important. They sometimes must yield to a cause greater still:
The defense of the American land.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/3

22

